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Europe and the Christian Democracy
Movement: A Once and Future Hope?
by
Allan Carlson, Ph.D.
This essay is odaptedfrom a lect11re pres nted to the Witherspoon Fellowship
of the Family Resea rch ouncil, Washington, D.C., Ju/ ; 20, 2005. It appears
here with permission. Th e author has served a Distinguished Fellow in
Family Policy at the Family Research Council and is president of the Howard
Center, in Illinois. He is the author of Fractured Generations: Crafting a
Family Policy for Twenty-First Century America and The Swedish
Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population
Crisis.

In August, 1992, during his address to the GOP National Convention, then
presidential candidate Pat Buchanan delighted his supporters and appalled
progressive Republicans when he stated:
My friends, this election is about much more than who gets what.
It is about who we are .. . There is a religious war going on in our
country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to
the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself.
1

The term 'cultur war' o often heard in our political di c ur e
peech. Yet the phra e , true orioin
today popularly dates f rom thi
aclllally reache, ba k ver a century and aero the Atlantic. During the
1870 Lh then-new German E mpire launched a broad a au lt on religi u
lib rty and fam ily au ton my, a campaign called kulturkampf (u·an lated
'cultuJe w~u·' ). Perhap the mo t important if unintended , re ult of thi
original 'cultUJe war' was to encourage a . till amorphou. p litical
movem nt, called hri tian Democracy in Germany and el ewbere .in
Eu rope. Thi . exp riment in applying Chri tian principle o popular
modern governan e developed its own hi tory of triumph and tragedy; and
it offer J • on for American also trying - now in the 2 J t Century - to
apply Chri tianity to modern democratic p Iitics.
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A Legacy of the French Revolution

It is said that the 20th Century Chinese Communist leader Zhou EnLai (1898-1976), when asked what the impact of the 1789 French
Revolution had been on human affairs, replied: "It's too soon to tell."
Actually, it is unclear to whom and just when Zhou said this. One
source says it was to the Archduke Otto van Hapsburg in 1948; another
source says to Richard Nixon in 1972; another to England's Tony Benn in
1975; and still another to a French journalist in 1989. The latter could be
called miraculous, for Zhou had been dead for thirteen years by then.
Perhaps Zhou, living and dead, has simply prattled this observation out to
every Westerner that he has met.
All the same, his answer rings true. The revolutionaries of 1789
unleashed passions and ideas that continue their work into our time. Many
of them directly target religious and family relations, including the leveling
idea of equality, the divorce revolution, secular liberalism, sexual freedom,
state-centered education, and communism. The French Revolution also
defined our modern political vocabulary: the labels "liberal," "radical,"
"socialist," and even "conservative" all derive from that time of fennent
(for example, it was books by Edmund Burke and Louis deBonald written
in reaction to the French Revolution that first defined modern
conservatism).
So, too, for Christian Democracy which also rose as a somewhat
delayed response to events in France. As a prominent early Christian
Democrat explained, 1789 marked "the birth year of modern life," which
he also described as "the catastrophe of 1789." 2 Indeed, one of the most
successful Christian Democratic parties would take the strange name, The
Anti-Revolutionary Party, in the late 1870s, and would retain it until just
two decades ago.
The Christian Democratic Platform

Authentic Christian Democracy, I hasten to add, has not been simply
another name for "conservatism." Unlike European conservatives, the
Democratic Christian goal has not been to defend the remnants of the old
feudal order, nor existing class structures, nor persons of wealth. Nor has
Christian Democracy simply been the "rural" or "country" party, defending
the interests of small farmers while ignoring the urban, industrial order.
Instead, the movement should be seen as a distinctly Christian
response to modernity, one with its own platform. To begin with, Christian
Democrats have understood the French Revolution as unleashing an
"appalling anti-Christian world power which, if Christ did not break it,
would rip this whole world forever out of the hands of its God and away
May, 2007
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from its own destiny." According to these partisans, the seculmism
spawned by the French Revolution produced a "system of modern and
almost incomprehensibly diabolical paganism." The movement has also
held that "it would be utterly absurd for a person to take ... a confession of
Christ on [his or her] lips and ignore the consequences that flow directly
from it for our national politics."3
Moreover, Christian Democracy has fonnally opposed economic
materialism, in both its socialist and liberal capitalist manifestations. In
this view, Europe's early 20th-Century disorders arose from the
"exaggerated liberal-capitalistic economic order" of the prior century. As
the Christian Democratic writer Maria Meyer-Sevenich explained:
... they [Marxism and fascism] are nothing but powerful
reactionary movements, grown out of the native soil
[Mutterboden] of the same liberal-capitalist thinking.4

Speaking in 1946, Josef Andre offered a Christian Democratic
interpretation of the meaning of the Nazi defeat in World War II:
The materialistic view of history is now at an end. What Hegel,
Darwin, Haeckel, Nietzsche and Karl Marx strove for, each from
his own field of expertise, has been historically overtaken and
destroyed with the National Socialist Zeitgeist. 5

Christian Democracy has provided instead, a spirit-centered, Christ-centered
world view that would build distinctive political and economic orders.
Notably, Christian Democracy has tood ·B r organic society. The
legacy of the French Revolution in both poljtics and economic wa a quest
for uniformity, which meant the uppression of div r ity tbe denjal of
"everything fresh and natural." Christian Democrats have held that the
spontaneous structures of human life - villages, towns, neighborhoods,
labor associations, and (above all) families - need protection from the
leveling tendencies of modernity. Only through these organic structures,
they have maintained, can the human personality thrive. As the French
philosopher Etienne Gilson explained:
From his birth to his death, each man is involved in a multiplicity
of natural social structures outside of which he could neither live
nor achieve his full development... Each of these groups
possesses a specific organic unity; first of aJl, there is the family,
the child's natural place of growth. 6

Christian Democrats have insisted that such groups pre-exist the state. That
is, the law does not create families and towns; it "finds them." Accordingly,
Christian Democrats have favored tax benefits and state allowances to support
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marriage and the birth and rearing of children as recognition of this prior
existence of families.
As analyst Guido Dierickx explains, Christian Democrats have also
viewed the family as holding both instrumental and intrinsic value. On the
one hand, the family is the vehicle for the regeneration of all society:
The Christian Democrats view the (core) family as a privileged
opportunity to implement their social... principles. They want the
citizens to adapt their private lives to demanding interpersonal
relationships . Family life, especially the traditional family life of a
married couple with several children, is a first embodiment of
such relationships in other sectors of society. 7

On the other hand, Christian Democrats also have used public policy torefunctionalize, and so strengthen, families. When they:
... would like to entrust more health care and other social service
duties to the family, they do so not just to alleviate the burden of
the state bureaucracy or of the Ministry of Finance, or to improve
the quality of the service rendered to the aged, the young and the
sick (though this too is a major consideration), but first and
foremost because they hope to strengthen the family. [They
believe that] the contemporary family is weakened by the loss of
social functionality.8

Similarly, Christian Democrats have sought to funnel additional
modern governmental services through other "organic" structures as well,
notably "non profit" and religious agencies. For example, in the nations of
Germany and the Netherlands, where Christian Democratic influence has
been decisive, state sectors now allocate nearly 70 percent of gross
domestic product. However, only 10 percent of this has been controlled by
the central government. Instead non-profit agencies - particularly those
with religious ties - have provided the largest share of program
implementation. 9

Two Paths to Christian Democracy
In its purest form, Christian Democracy has also aimed at Christian
political unity. The Enlightenment of the 18th Century, which spawned the
ideological side of the French Revolution, had itself emerged largely in
revulsion over the religious wars of the prior, or 17th century. In that
intolerant, bloody era, Catholics and Protestants battled against each other.
Millions died in this Christian civil war. The modem Christian Democracy
movement has consciously worked to transcend theological differences
between Catholic and Protestant by focusing on the common enemy - the
May, 2007
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"appalling anti-Christian world power" - and by building a common
social-political program. All the same, there were distinctive Roman
Catholic and Protestant paths to this end.
The Catholic effort had to overcome the view that the Church of
Rome, from the fall of Napoleon in 1815 through the revolutions of 1848,
was reactionary, favoring the oppression of the people, opposing their
democratic aspirations, and ignoring the new problems posed by industrial
society. 10 It was in the German states that the revolutionary year 1848 saw
creation of "The Catholic Federation of Germany." Designed to protect
Catholic rights in any future German union, this "Catholic club" became
the "Fraction of the Center" in 1858, and eventually The Center Party.
While open in theory to non-Catholics, the Center Party focused first and
foremost on defending Catholic authority, rights, and church schools.
However, the young Bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm Emmanuel, Baron
von Ketteler, began to shape a more interesting and ecumenical social
Catholicism. During the Catholic Congress of 1848, he offered a toast to
"the plain people" of Germany and declared that "as religion has need of
freedom, so does freedom have need of religion": in that time and place,
these were unexpected, radical statements. During the 1860s, Bishop
Ketteler turned to the "social question." He denounced the development of
what he called "capitalist absolutism," called for the creation of Christian
labor associations to protect workers, and urged political reforms that
would increase wages, shorten the working day, and prohibit the labor of
children and mothers in factories. 11
In 1871, following German victory in the Franco-Prussian War, the
German Empire took form. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck immediately
launched his Kulturkampf At one level, this "culture war" aimed at
reducing the influence of the Catholic Church in a predominantly
Protestant empire. The Jesuit religious order, for example, was banned. At
another level, however, all Christians faced new restrictions. An 1871 law
banned all clergymen from discussing political issues from the pulpit.
Other laws gave the German state more control over the education of all
clergy, created a special secular court for legal cases involving clerics, and
required state notification of all clerical employment. In 1875, the Empire
required that all maniages be civil- not church- ceremonies. In response,
Catholic political action through the Center Party accelerated. This
"Culture War" lasted until 1878, when Bismarck decided that the greater
internal threat to the German Empire came from the socialists.
The "social Catholicism" of Bishop Ketteler and the foray into electoral
politics represented by Germany's Center Party came together in Pope Leo
XIII's 1891 encyclical, The New Age (Rerum Novarum). This remarkable
document testified to Roman Catholicism's willingness to meet the promise
and problems of industrialization with an affirmative Christian alternative
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both to the laissez-faire of classical liberalism and to socialism. Arguing
that "the present age handed over the workers, each alone and defenseless,
to the inhumanity of employers and the unbridled greed of competitors,"
Leo rejected the wage theory of liberalism that considered that wage just
which resulted from a free contract between employer and worker. Leo
repudiated socialism with even greater fervor, terming it "highly unjust"
because it injured workers, violated the rights of lawful owners, perverted
the functions of the state, and threw governments "into utter confusion."
Instead, Leo turned to "the natural and primeval right of marriage"
and to the family - "the society of the household" - as the proper
foundation for social and economic theory. The right of ownership, for
example, while bestowed on individuals by nature, was necessarily
"assigned to man in his capacity as head of a family." Similarly, Leo
declared it "a most sacred law of nature that the father of a family see that
his offspring are provided with all the necessities of life .. ." In the natural
order, he continued, it was not right "to demand of woman or a child what
a strong adult man is capable of doing or would be willing to do." Women,
he affirmed were "intended by nature for the work of the home ... the
education of children and the well-being of the family." Consequently, Leo
concluded, the principle underlying all employer-worker contracts must be
that the wage be at least "sufficiently large to enable [the worker] to
provide comfortably for himself, his wife, and his children ... " 12 This was
the goal of the "family wage."
Christian Democracy from the Catholic side is, in fact, best
understood as Rerum Novarum put into action. Indeed, in 1901, Leo issued
another encyclical, Graves de Communi Re, which openly embraced the
"Christian Democracy" label. Contrasting this movement with the
principles of Democratic Socialism, Leo stated:
... Christian Democracy, by the fact that it is Clu·istian, is built, and
necessarily so, on the basic principles of divine faith, and it must
provide better conditions for the masses, with the ulterior object
of promoting the perfection of souls made for things etemal. Hence,
for Christian Democracy, justice is sacred; it must maintain that
the right of acquiring and possessing property cannot be impugned,
and it must safeguard the various distinctions and degrees which
are indispensable in every well-ordered commonwealth. 13

In 1906, Germany's Center Party launched a great debate on its
future. Julius Bachem's article, "We Must Get Out of the Tower" ("Wir
muss en aus dem Turm hera us"), argued that the Party should cease being
strictly "Catholic" and should increase its Protestant membership as the
only way to break out of perpetual minority status. Action toward this end,
however, was deferred.
May, 2007
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Abraham Kuyper

The Protestant strain of Christian Democracy is strongly associated
with the Dutch pastor, editor, and politician Abraham Kuyper. The
Netherlands, it is important to remember here, was- almost uniquely- a
nation born out of religious sentiment. For 80 years (1566-1648), the
Dutch Calvinists had fought the Catholic Hapsburgs for religious - and
ultimately political - freedom. The Kingdom of the Netherlands was,
most assuredly, a nation with the soul of a church (and a Protestant one
at that).
The armies of the French Revolution, however, swept over the
Netherlands, unleashing there the "anti-Christian world power." The
necessary task became the rebuilding of a Christian nation. In 1879,
Kuyper transformed a confessional Calvinist political movement into
the Anti-Revolutionary Party. He saw the French Revolution as
marking:
...the emergence of a spirit that stole into the historical life of
nations and fundamentally set their hearts against Christ as the
God-anointed King ... In place of the worship of the most high
God came, courtesy of Humanism, the worship of Man. Human
destiny was shifted from heaven to earth . The Scriptures were
unraveled and the Word of God shamefully repudiated in order to
pl ay hostage to the majesty of Reason. 14

Kuyper also raised his banner against the intrusion of the industrial
principle into local, organic communities. Although writing in 1869, he
could have had Wal-Mart in mind when he said: "The power of capital, in
ever more enormous accumulations, drains away the life blood from our
retail trade. A single gigantic wholesaler swallows up the patronage that
formerly enabled any number of stores to flourish." 15 What he called "the
iron steam engine" even endangered the family:
No longer should each baby drink warm milk from the breast of
its own mother; we should have some tepid mixture prepared for
all babies collectively. No longer should each child have a place to
play at home by its mother; all should go to a common nursery
school. 16

All the same, Kuyper emphasized that there was no going
backwards. Rather, those who believed in Christ must embrace democracy,
the spirit of which would only grow. They must "position themselves
courageously in the breach of this nation" and "prepare for a Christiandemocratic development of our national government." 17
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through social bodies such as family, local community, and labor
association. He called for creation of a revolutionary Christian party, one
"hard," one worthy of Christ, one "radical" in its social-economic vision. 19
In 1943, a young Catholic philosophy student and disciple of
Mounier, Gilbert Dru, drew up a Manifesto for postwar Christian
Democratic work. He emphasized the transforming quality of true
Christian action: the whole person must become engaged, not just as a cog
in a party machine, but as a militant working to build a new France on
radical Christian principles. A year later, Dru paid for this Manifesto with
his life, being shot by the German Gestapo in Lyons. 20
The further elaboration of Christian Democratic doctrine came
primarily from two journalist-philosophers, Etienne Gilson and Etienne
Borne, both writing for the joumal, Aube. They rejected the atomistic
individualism of the 19th Century "bourgeoisie" which, they said, had
exhibited a "narrow," self-centered outlook and had shown "an
indifference toward basic institutions such as the family." These writers
also scorned the Socialists and Communists for their "materialism" and
their hostility toward revealed religion. Indeed, bourgeois liberalism and
communism could be seen as "two facets of a single error." The task now
facing Western Civilization was to find a middle way between bourgeois
liberalism and collectivism. 21
A second plank in the new Christian Democratic platform was that,
while the movement and party would be openly Christian, it would be
neither clerical nor strictly Catholic. Following the anti-religious darkness
of the Nazi conquest of Europe, this movement would instead forcefully
seek to unite Catholic and Protestant believers and sympathetic others Jews and agnostics- in a defense of Christendom as a civilization with
religiously infused values.22
Christian Democracy also sought to deliver both freedom and
justice. As Etienne Borne explained:
Freedom without justice is artificial, deceptive and hypocritical; it
can be used to justify the mechanism of the free market and the
servitude of the proletariat; such freedom is, in fact, the antithesis
of freedom. Likewise, justice without freedom leads to tyranny
and to the totalitarianism of Soviet communism or Fascist
corporatism. 23

To accomplish these tasks - this is, to reconcile individualism with
community and to deliver both justice and liberty- the French Christian
Democrats gave priority to the defense of natural social groups. As Bome
put it: "A people is not really a people and certainly does not live in
freedom unless the natural social groups which compose it accept each
102
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other, and unless the state recognizes their differences and ensures that
their interests are represented." 24 This would be true democratic pluralism.
Notably, these new Christian Democrats also renounced the
patriarchal, paternalistic family system of old Europe. The fatherdominated family could not be reconciled with "personalism," they said.
Post-war Christian Democrats held that women should enjoy equal civil,
legal, and political rights . At the same time, restoration of the family did
mean: that control of education should be returned to parents; that
motherhood and childhood should enjoy special protection by the state;
and that heads-of-households should receive a "family wage," so that
mothers might be empowered to remain home with their children. 25
Human Rights also became a defining Christian Democratic
concern, but with a special twist. Where secular views of the French
experience relied on an evolutionary understanding of rights, the new
movement emphasized the rooting of human rights in the Creation itself in
the Natural Law. Such rights were "inviolable" and "innate" because their
fountainhead was God Himself. Bearing a healthy suspicion of the state,
Christian Democrats embraced Human Rights in order to protect "the
natural rights of each individual" and of "natural social groups" from the
overweening power of government. 26
Out of this genuine intellectual ferment, Christian Democracy took
political form as the Mouvement Republicain Populaire (or MRP), which
became part of the French governing coalition of 1946.27 In the
Netherlands, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, in alliance with the Catholic
Party, reclaimed governing power the same year. Christian Democratic
parties then won important elections in formerly fascist Italy (1948) and
West Germany (1949). 28

Large Effects
The effect was large. Christian Democracy created the spiritual and
political conditions that made possible rapid European economic renewal.
It also laid the foundations for the building of welfare states that were
broadly supportive of families organized on the male breadwinner, female
homemaker, childrich model. This Christian Democratic moment had two
other important results. First, the dream of European Union was largely
born among the postwar generation of Christian Democratic leaders,
notably Robert Schumann of France, Conrad Adenauer of West Germany,
and Alcide de Gaspari of Italy. The early treaties creating the European
Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 1952) and the European Economic
Community (Rome, 1957) focused ostensibly on economic questions .
However, their animating spirit came from a dream to revive Cluistendom;
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indeed, to build a democratic version of the old Holy Roman Empire on the
mins of a continent recently ravaged by war.
The other enduring legacy of post-war Christian Democracy was the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The key architects of this
document were: Charles Malik, an Arab Christian Democrat from Lebanon,
who served in 1948 both as secretary of the Commission on Human Rights
and as president of the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council; and Rene
Cassin, a French specialist in international law who, while himself Jewish,
was highly sympathetic toward postwar Christian Democracy. 29 As one
historian has phrased it, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
"largely identical" with the worldview expressed in Christian Democracy. 30
Specifically, we find in Article 16(3) the affirmation of "natural"
social institutions:
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the state.

The word "natural" comes straight out of the Christian Democratic
lexicon. Even the use of the word "society" here as distinct from and prior
to "the state" is a Christian Democratic marker.
In Article 25 , one finds support for family social rights, with
particular emphasis on a "family wage":
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and his family, including, food,
clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control..

Other provisions declare that men and women have "the right to
man·y and found a family" [Article 16(1)] and that "motherhood and
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance" [Article 25(2)]. The
Universal Declaration also affirms parental rights: "Parents have a prior
right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children"
[Article 26(3)].
Even the term "equality," subject before and later to so much
mischief, finds rich meaning in the Universal Declaration through
"personalist" conceptions of "the right to life" (Article 3), "the dignity and
worth of the human person" (Preamble), and "endowed" human nature:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood (Article l).
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Indeed, the only core Christian Democratic theme not present is an
open affirmation of the Deity of Creation. Several members of the drafting
committee, led by Charles Malik, sought inclusion of this idea. But in the end,
they agreed to more universal language that implied, rather than named, God. 31
"Silent Revolution"

Yet, as early as the 1950s, Christian Democracy as a vital worldview
entered another period of crisis. The youthful excitement, energy, and
sense of positive Christian revolution evident in the 1940s dissipated. In
France, Christian Democracy's main political vehicle, the MRP, lost
support to General Charles de Gaulle's new party, the RPI (Ressemblement
du Peuple Francois) and by 1958 had disappeared altogether. In Italy and
West Germany, meanwhile, Christian Democratic parties consolidated
their hold on power at the price of their vision. By the early 1960s, they
were increasingly pragmatic and bureaucratic, self-satisfied defenders of
the status quo. Ambitious office seekers, rather than Christian idealists,
came to dominate the party. Movements for "moral and political renewal"
became simply mass parties of the right-of-center. 32 When a new "crisis of
values" hit Europe with particular force in the late 1960s, the Christian
Democrats were unprepared to respond. They appeared by then as old and
discredited guardians of a new kind of materialism, the very opposite of
what the movement's visionaries intended. 33
Indeed, it is now clear that a "silent revolution" in values set in
among Europeans after 1963. It can be seen in the shift away from values
affirmed by Christian teaching (such as "responsibility, sacrifice, altruism,
and sanctity of long-term commitments") and toward a strong "secular
individualism" focused on the desires of the self. 34 Family life became a
casualty. Surveys of European youth in the 1970s and 1980s showed that
they "appear to be extending non-conformism with respect to abortion,
divorce, etc., to parenthood as well," agreeing by large majorities with
statements such as "children need only one parent" and "children are no
longer needed for personal fulfillment."
In explaining this value change, another commentator has pointed to
the swift legalization of abortion and to "the falling awareness" among
Europeans "of the dignity of every person, even the old and disabled." He
added: " ... naked individualism and unbridled libertinism have become
increasingly widespread in recent years ... Female emancipation, which is
well advanced, ... appears to be headed in this direction," as well.
Meanwhile, the courts and public opinion grew tolerant of sexual
deviance. 35 Understood in terms of worldview, such changes symbolized
the new triumph of an old foe- "the anti-Christian world power" originally
unleashed in 1789- over Christian Democracy.
May, 2007
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New Hope from the East?

All the same, the 1990s marked another resurgence of Christian
Democracy, albeit in unexpected places. For instance, a Swedish election
in 1991 brought the Christian Democratic Social Party into Sweden's
Parliament for the first time, where it joined the governing coalition. Over
the next three years, the party successfully pushed for the teaching of
Christian values in the state schools and for a new social benefit to go to
stay-at-home parents.
More dramatically, Christian Democratic parties emerged in all of
the East European nations freed from Communism in 1989-90. In Poland,
to choose one example, the Solidarity Electoral Action bloc came to power
in 1997, with a campaign manifesto declaring:
We can build a modern, just, and self-sustaining sovereign state; a
state founded on patriotic and Christian values, on love and
freedom. These values have formed our core identity for a
thousand years.

In Rumania, the National Peasants' Christian Democratic Party won that
nation's November 1996 election. Christian Democratic parties have also
been part of ruling coalitions in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Lithuania, and Latvia. 36
Family issues loom large in these nations and on Christian
Democratic agendas. The legacy of Communism combined with the
arrival of Western-styled social libertarianism to produce a devastating
effect on East European family structures. Since 1990, divorce rates have
soared; marriage rates have fallen sharply; birth rates have plummeted.
Indeed, in 2005, the list of the ten nations with the world's lowest total
fertility rates includes Latvi~ (1.26), Poland (1.24), Slovenia (1.24), the
Czech Republic (1.20), anti Lithuania (1.19) . In response, Christian
Democratic parliamentarians from six "new member states of the
European Union" - namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Poland,
Lithuania, and Estonia - met last year and issued their "Family First
Declaration." They fonnally endorsed the March 2004 "Mexico City
Declaration" of The World Congress of Families, and they pledged:
We will coordinate our efforts on behalf of the traditional family,
marriage and the intrinsic value of each human life so that the
future Europe is not associated any longer with the culture of
death, institutionalized egoism and population decline, but with
the preservation of religious, ethical and cultural values that
enhance virtuous life in all relevant aspects. Healthy family life
enhances true and ordered liberty and limits the power of the state.
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This document also endorsed other principles central to the Christian
Democratic worldview :
• "Procreation is the key to the survival of the human race."
• "Parents possess the primary authority and responsibility to
direct the upbringing and education of their children."
•"Good government protects and supports the family and does not
usurp the vital roles it plays in society."
• "Sexuality exists for the expression of love between husband
and wife and for the procreation of children in the covenant of
marriage."

If Eastern Europe - indeed, if Europe as a whole has any viable
future, it lies along these Christian Democratic lines.

Lessons
There has never been a serious Christian Democratic Party in
America. This seems due, in part, to the mechanics of our single-district
electoral structure, which strongly favor a two-party system with each
party in turn serving as an ad hoc coalition of interest groups. Christian
Democratic parties -with their more coherent worldview - thrive best in
places that use proportional representation.
Also, Americans have had a more complex or, one might say, more
confused relationship with the legacy of the French Revolution. Back
during the 1790s, Americans were more likely to sympathize with the
Revolution's repudiation of royal and feudal power and its appeals to
democracy than to won·y about the suppression of the Catholic Church. In
1803, President Thomas Jefferson cut a sweet deal with Napoleon for the
purchase of the Louisiana Territory. And in 1812, the United States found
itself again at war with France's chief enemy, the British Empire: and the
enemy of my enemy is my friend. Relatively few Americans have shared,
say, Abraham Kuyper's nightmarish view of "the catastrophe of 1789."
Still, Europe's experiment in Christian Democracy offers several
broad lessons for all Christians engaged in modem politics:
First, the movement has had the most success when it has held true
to the "full" Gospel, particularly to Christ's radical command that
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we love our neighbors as ourselves. Issues of social welfare and
social justice lie near the heart of true Christian Democracy.
Second, this movement successfully pioneered ways to funnel
public health, education, and welfare programs through churches
and church-related agencies, models that should be of interest to a
nation now experimenting with faith-based initiatives.
Third, Christian Democracy has, at its best, carved out a "third
way" of social-economic policy, independent of both the liberalcapitalist and socialist mindsets, by being respectful toward family
life and the health of local communities.
And fourth, this movement succeeded only so long as it found
animation in authentic Christian faith and enthusiasm. When those
diminished, so did the coherence and effectiveness of Christian
Democracy, and of the modem European nations as whole.
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